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Note

Rule 10b-5: Scienter Displaces
The Flexible Duty Standard
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Judicial creation of a private cause of action' under rule lOb-5,2
which was promulgated pursuant to section 10 (b) 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 4 gave rise to a number of perplexing issues. One of the most formidable was whether proof of
scienter was a necessary element for recovery. Lacking congressional direction, 5 courts were free to fashion the state of mind
1. A private cause of action under rule 10b-5, the administrative counterpart to section 10(b), arose five years after its adoption in Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.), additionalfindings
of fact, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
2. The text of rule 10b-5 is as follows:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
3.
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970) Lhereinafter referred to as section 10(b) in
text].
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78hh (1970).
5. See note 29 infra.

RULE 10b-5
standard flexibly, by pursuing what is recognized as the broad
policy of section 10(b)-the prevention of fraud on the public by
persons connected with the purchase or sale of securities. Predictably, the standards adopted within the United States courts of
appeals 6 varied, depending upon such considerations as the type of
relationship between the parties, the forseeability of injury to the
plaintiff by the defendant, the ease with which such injury could
have been avoided, the degree of culpability attending the defendant's act, and most important, the court's perception of congressional intent behind the language of section 10(b). The Supreme
Court's recent decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder7 resolved the
conflict by mandating that scienter be proved prior to any recovery
for a private right of action under section 10(b).
Although the Court's decision in Hochfelder brought some
welcome structure to an otherwise amorphous state of law, some
questions regarding the scope of the decision deserve further attention. This note will examine the development of the law with
respect to the state of mind element8 in rule 10b-5 cases prior to
Hochfelder, and will present some observations concerning the
possible impact of this recent case.
II. FACTS
In Hochfelder, defendant Ernst & Ernst had been retained by
First Securities Company of Chicago, a small brokerage firm, to
perform periodic audits of the firm's books and records from 1946
to 1967. In addition, annual reports were prepared pursuant to
the requirements of section 17(a) 9 of the Securities Exchange Act
6. See note 36 infra.
7. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
8. For the purposes of this article, the "state of mind element" generically
refers to those standards commentators have ascribed to the duty of
care exercised and the state of knowledge possessed by an individual.
9. Pertinent parts of the provision read:
Every . . broker or dealer who transacts a business in securities through the medium of any such member [of a national
securities exchange] . . . shall make, and keep for prescribed
periods such records, furnish such copies thereof, and make
and disseminate such reports as the Commission by rule prescribes as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors. ...
15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970).
The report of a member, broker or dealer shall be certified
by a certified public accountant or a public accountant who
shall be in fact independent.
17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(b) (d) (1976).
The audit shall be made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and shall include a review of the
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of 1934. During this twenty-one year period, Lester Nay, president
and major stockholder of the firm, had induced plaintiffs to make
investments in escrow accounts. Nay instructed customers to make
checks payable to himself or to a designated bank account, and
converted the funds to his personal use, omitting to make any
entries in First Securities' books. The fraud was uncovered in
1968 when Nay committed suicide, leaving a note describing the
escrow accounts as "spurious." Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit
against Ernst & Ernst for damages, basing their secondary liability
claim on the theory that Ernst & Ernst had "aided and abetted"
Nay's violations by negligently failing to utilize appropriate auditing procedures to uncover internal practices concealing the fraud.
Specifically, Nay had adopted a "mail rule," whereby no one was
permitted to open mail addressed to him at First Securities, even
while he was on extended vacations. Plaintiffs contended that had
this "mail rule" been disclosed in its annual report to the Securities
and Exchange Commission, an investigation of Nay by the Commission would have uncovered the fraudulent scheme involving the
escrow account much earlier, preventing extensive investment losses.
III.

THE STATE OF MIND ELEMENT BEFORE
HOCHFELDER

A.

Connon Law

A rule lOb-5 action has as its progenitor the common law
action of deceit. Although the deceit action is of early origin,' 0 it
was not until 17891" that an English court determined it to be
purely a tort action which would lie regardless of any contractual
relationship between the parties.
As the divergence between deceit actions in tort and in contract
broadened, the different elements required for each action also
became apparent. Derry v. Peek 2 is the leading case of tortious
misrepresentation, requiring proof by the plaintiff that defendant
knew the falsity of his statement, a showing of mere negligence
being insufficient. The facts and holding of Derry, which involved
accounting system, the internal accounting control and procedures for safeguarding securities.
[1976] 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 33,924.
10. As early as 1201, there existed in England a writ of deceit which would
lie against a person misusing legal procedure for the purpose of swindling someone. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 685 (4th ed. 1971).
11. Palsey v. Freeman, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1789). This case is commonly referred to as the parent of the modern deceit action.
12. [1889] 14 A.C. 337.

RULE 10b-5
misrepresentation in the issuance of stock, contribute to an understanding of security fraud cases under common law. In Derry,
directors of a tramway company issued a prospectus containing a
statement that the company had received authorization to use
steam or mechanical power for the propulsion of its tramway.
Plaintiff, allegedly relying on this statement, purchased shares of
stock in the company. Subsequent to his purchase, the directors
learned that further government authorization was necessary for
the company to operate the tramway mechanically. Application
for such authorization was denied and the company became insolvent. In denying recovery based upon a negligence theory, Lord
Herschell stated:
First, in order to sustain an action of deceit there must be proof
of fraud, and nothing short of that will suffice. Secondly, fraud
is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been
made 1) knowingly, or 2) without belief in its truth, or 3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false ....

Thirdly, if fraud

be proved, the motive of the person guilty of it is immaterial.' 3

The three states of mind traditionally viewed as elements of
scienter are (1) knowledge of the false representation, (2) lack of
a belief in its truth, or (3) reckless disregard for its truth. 14 Derry
drew the line between scienter and negligence, holding that scienter
would not be found if defendants had a good faith belief in the
truth of their representation. However, as Professor Prosser noted,
"the very unreasonableness of such a belief may be strong evi5
dence that it does not in fact exist."'
Later courts 16 justified disallowance of recovery in deceit cases
when mere negligence was alleged on the notion that an invasion of
a pecuniary interest was not worthy of the same treatment as
negligent injury to the person or property of another. 17 That
13. Id. at 374.
14. Professor Prosser's analysis of cases applying scienter concludes that:
There is of course no difficulty in finding the required intent
to mislead where it appears that the speaker believes his
statement to be false. Likewise there is general agreement
that it is present when the representation is made without any
belief as to its truth, or with reckless disregard whether it be
true or false. Further than this, it appears that all courts have
extended it to include representations made by one who is
conscious that he has no sufficient basis of information to
justify them.
W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 701.

15. Id.
16. See Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 164 (C.A. 1950).
17. It was not until 1964, in Hedley Bryne & Co. v. Heller & Partners,
[1964] A.C. 465 (1963), that the House of Lords overruled past case
law, extending liability for negligence to pecuniary loss in any case
where some "special relation" between the parties could be found.
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notion, coupled with the impetus of the Derry decision, prevailed in
the American courts until 1927, when in International Products
Co. v. Erie R. Co., 1 8 the New York Court of Appeals permitted
recovery for "negligent misrepresentation." Judge Andrews, delivering the opinion of the court, wrote:
Liability in such cases arises only where there is a duty, if one
speaks at all, to give the correct information ....
There must be
knowledge, or its equivalent, that the information is desired for
a serious purpose ....
Finally, the relationship of the parties,
arising out of contract or otherwise, must be such that in morals
and good conscience the one has the right to rely upon the other
for information ....
We have an inquiry such as might be expected in the usual course
of business made of one who alone knew the truth. We have a
negligent answer, untrue in fact, actual reliance upon it, and resulting proximate loss.' 9
International Products initiated a new line of decisions 20 which

shifted the emphasis for determining liability from defendant's
state of mind to the type of relationship 2' existing between the
parties when the misrepresentation was made. In International
Products, a bailor-bailee relationship was sufficient to impose liability for negligent misrepresentation.
18. 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662, cert. denied, 275 U.S. 527 (1927).
19. Id. at 338-39, 155 N.E. at 664.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia & Diaz, Inc., 291 F.2d 242 (2d Cir.
1961) (defendant's act in incorrectly weighing government freight
shipment need not have been intentional for liability under misrepresentation); Park National Bank v. Globe Indemnity Co., 332 Mo. 1089,
61 S.W.2d 733 (1933) (notary public liable for negligently certifying
a false certificate); Doyle v. Chatman & Phenix Nat. Bank of
New York, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 (1930) (good faith purchaser
permitted recovery for trustee's negligent representation in certifying
corporate bonds).
21. In deceit cases where scienter must be proved and is then found lacking, courts can generally dispose of the issue without resort to discussion of whether a duty was owed the plaintiff by defendant. Once
intent is shown, most American courts facing the issue have followed
Peek v. Gurney, [1873] L.R. 6 E. & I. App. 377, limiting liability to
those whom defendant desired to influence. See W. PROSSER, supra
note 10, at 702. In some cases, courts have been willing to extend
liability to situations where defendant had a definite reason to anticipate plaintiff's reliance. See, e.g., New York Title & Mortgage Co.
v. Hutton, 71 F.2d 989 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 605 (1934)
(defendant could not "as an ordinarily prudent man anticipate" that
its letter would be used to solicit stock purchases); National Shawmut
Bank of Boston v. Johnson, 317 Mass. 485, 58 N.E.2d 849 (1949) (forged
signatures went with the notes, entitling the holder in due course to

maintain an action in deceit).

RULE 10b-5
One consideration deemed significant in determining which
relationships give rise to liability is the forseeability of a plaintiff's
reliance. However, most courts considering this issue have been
reluctant to extend liability to all situations where plaintiff's reliance on the statement was forseeable. 2 2 This reluctance may be
due to the fact that injuries to pecuniary interests through misrepresentation potentially can involve more plaintiffs and higher
monetary damages than tort cases involving personal injury or
property damage. Explanation of the difference lies in the nature
of the tort. Whereas property and personal injury suits generally
are confined to the immediate participants, vicinity, and time of the
tortious act, injury caused by a misrepresentation is often widely
disseminated to the public via mass communication. The scope of
liability is especially broad in security cases, particularly when an
accountant's auditing reports will be relied upon by a large number
of creditors, stockholders, banks, and persons contemplating purchase of securities. 23 Consequently, courts accepting negligent
misrepresentation as a basis of liability generally draw the line as
follows:
When the representation is made directly to the plaintiff, in the
course of dealings with the defendant, or is exhibited to him by
the defendant with knowledge that he intends to rely upon it, or
even where he is an unidentified member of a group or class all
of whom defendant is seeking to influence, there has been no difficulty in finding a duty of reasonable care; and the same duty has
been found where it is made to a third person with knowledge
that he intends to communicate it to the specific individual plaintiff
for the purpose of inducing him to act.
[M]ere reasonable anticipation that the statement will be communicated to others whose identity is unknown to the defendant,
or even knowledge that the recipient intends to make some commercial use of it in dealing with unspecified 24third parties, is not
sufficient to create a duty of care toward them.
Distinctions between liability for economic and property or
personal injury have whithered with the passage of time and chang22. W.

PROSSER,

supra note 10, at 702.

23. For an excellent discussion of the developing securities law with respect to accountant's liability, see Fiflis, CurrentProblems of Accountant's Responsibilitiesto Third Parties,28 VAND. L. REV. 31 (1975).

24. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 707-08. The most notable cases cited
by commentators as representing the line of liability were written by
Justice Cardozo while sitting on the New York Court of Appeals. In
Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922), defendants had
incorrectly certified the weight sheets of beans sold to the plaintiffs by
a third party. Finding the plaintiffs liable for negligent misrepresentation, the court stated: "The plaintiffs use of the certificate was not
an indirect or collateral consequence of the action of the weighers.
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ing social attitudes to the extent that many courts would permit a
common law recovery upon a showing of negligence. However,
further expansion of the common law 25 associated with securities
fraud largely has been pre-empted by blue sky laws and most
significantly, federal securities laws.
B.

Rule 10b-5 Private Rights of Action

Congress's response to the inimical practices employed in security markets, leading to the crash of 1929, was the Securities Act
of 193326 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.27 The two
acts were passed following extensive hearings and committee debates considering the appropriate mechanisms and standards for
ensuring adequate disclosure of material information to the investor.
However, section 10 (b) 28 of the 1934 Act was passed by both the
House and Senate with little of the controversy and debate surrounding other provisions of the Act. 29

The salient features of the

provision are as follows.
It shall be unlawful ....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security . . .any manipulative or deceptive device or contriv-

ance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe ....

Mindful that no private right of action explicitly was provided
for in section 10 (b), House and Senate leaders apparently were oblivious to the potential of section 10 (b) as a major vehicle for fraud
It was a consequence which, to the weigher's knowledge, was the end
and aim of the transaction." Id. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275. The potential scope of this language instilled sufficient anxiety in the business
community to compel Justice Cardozo to more clearly define its limits
years later in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170,
174 N.E. 441 (1931). The defendants, a reputable accounting firm, had

25.

26.
27.
28.
29.

certified a balance sheet of Fred Stern & Co. as representing accurately its financial condition, when in fact, the books had been falsified by those in charge of the business. Upon distinguishing the facts
of Glanzer, the court in Ultramares found no duty was owed to the
plaintiffs to certify the financial sheets free from negligence, their reliance being incidental and collateral to the service rendered primarily
for the benefit of Fred Stern & Co.
Besides the state of mind standard, plaintiffs suing under common law
must contend with elements of "the relationship of the parties," "justifiable reliance," and "resultant damage stemming from defendant's
statement." See W. PROSSER, supranote 10, at 685-86.
15 U.S.C. § 77a-77bbbb (1970).
See note 4 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970).
Of nearly a thousand pages of hearings in the House, the combined

RULE lOb-5
recovery.3 0 Consequently, scant material exists from which to draw
expressions of congressional intent regarding the state of mind a
defendant must possess for a plaintiff to maintain an action under
section 10 (b).
Rule 10b-5, 3 1 like its statutory parent, was adopted without
controversy in 1942. The Securities and Exchange Commission
promulgated the rule in response to an alleged case where a
corporate insider fraudulently was able to purchase its firm's securities with impunity from existing Commission enforcement powers.3 2 Because the only provision which dealt with purchases of
securities was section 10(b), the Commission staff drafted rule
33

drawing
much of its language from section 17(a) of the
34
1933 Act.
10b-5,

Nearly 14 years after the passage of the Securities Act of 1934,
a private right of action under rule 10b-5 was first recognized in
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.35 As other courts followed the
Kardon lead, differences arose between the federal circuits3

6

over

whether a rule 10b-5 action could be maintained absent a showing
of scienter, and if so, under what circumstances. This confusion
can be attributed primarily to three sources. First, the scant
references to § 10 (b) (then 9 (c)) would scarcely fill a page. Much
the same is true in the Senate. 1 A. BROMBERG, SEcURItIEs LAW FRAUD:
SEC RULE 10b-5, 22.3 (1975). The committee reports paraphrase the
language of the several Bills, providing little direction concerning the

state of mind standard. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18
(1934); H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1934).
30. At the same time, there is no indication that Congress thought it was
creating private rights in § 10(b). See A. BROMBERG, supra note 29,

at 22.4. See also Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial
Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627, 642-60 (1963).
31. See note 2 supra.
32. The now well-known address of Milton Freeman, the former employee
of the Securities and Exchange Commission responsible for drafting
rule 10b-5, is revealing of the Commission's failure at that time to
appreciate the rule's future impact. See Freeman, Conference on

Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922
(1967). See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1945).
33. See note 2 supra.

34. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
35. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.), additional findings of fact, 83 F. Supp.
613 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
36. Cases holding that negligence alone is sufficient for liability under
rule lOb-5 include White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974); My-

zel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1967);
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963). Two courts of
appeals have held that some type of scienter is required.

See, e.g.,

Clegg v. Clonk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1007 (1975); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
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legislative history on section 10(b) does not contemplate a private
cause of action. 37 Accordingly, Congress did not consider whether
scienter should be an element of such an action. Second, many
courts have indicated that application of a single standard would
produce intolerable results. Consequently, the broad language of
Rule 10b-5 has permitted courts to find liability for fraud in a
variety of factual situations. This flexible approach accounts for
the significance of a particular element in each case, depending
upon such inquiries as defendant's culpability in bringing about the
injury, the foreseeability of reliance by the plaintiff, or the extent to
which the defendant should be required to compensate the defendant for his loss. Finally, courts and commentators 38 are at odds on
how to resolve semantical problems arising through use of different
sets of standards for what are conceptually identical results. For
instance, Professor Bromberg prefers separating the historical standards used in deceit and misrepresentation cases into three distinguishing classifications: (1) knowledge, (2) state of mind, and (3)
care criteria. 39 "Knowledge" criteria are purportedly the most
appropriate to use in section 10(b) cases because no moral connotation attaches to these standards as was historically the case with
"state of mind" and "care" criteria. However, the Court in Hochfelder, like other courts previously, made reference throughout the
opinion to "negligence," a criterion Professor Bromberg reserves
40
for standards dealing with care.
A review of the major cases in the various federal circuit courts
of appeals reveals two general approaches used to dispose of the
state of mind issue in rule 10b-5 cases: (1) the "flexible duty standard" and (2) the requirement of scienter. A short discussion of
these approaches follows, focusing on two cases representative of
their respective lines of authority.
The "flexible duty standard" was coined after commentators 41
recognized that one group of decisions articulated different stand37. See note 30 supra.
38. See, e.g., Green, The Communicative Torts, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1975).
Professor Green contends that the two areas of tort law are based
on a duty of care and the duty to inform. The failure of courts to
recognize this distinction is said to have resulted in added confusion
in applying the requisite standard.
39. A. BROMBERG, supra note 29, at 204.101-.105.

40. Id. at 204.104.

41. See Comment, Development of a Flexible Duty Standard of Liability
Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 99 (1975); Scienter
and Rule 10b-5: Development of a New Standard, 23 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 493 (1974),

RULE 10b-5
ards, depending upon the facts of each case. White v. Abrams 42 was
the first important case to list those factors to be considered when
determining the requisite state of mind standards to be applied.
Although it would be inappropriate for us to attempt to set forth
all of these factors, past 10b-5 cases have established many of them.
Without limiting the trial court from making additions or adaptations in a particular case, we feel the court should, in instructing
on a defendant's duty under rule lOb-5, require the jury to consider
the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff, the defendant's
access to the information as compared to the plaintiff's access, the
benefit that the defendant derives from the relationship, the defendant's awareness of whether the plaintiff was relying upon their
relationship in making his investment decisions and the defendant's
43
activity in initiating the securities transaction in question.
Although courts that followed the flexible duty approach found
negligence alone to be a sufficient basis for liability, some circuits
continued to require some type of scienter for civil liability under
rule 10b-5. Exemplary is the Second Circuit's decision in Lanza
v. Drexel Co..44

There the court relied upon the words of section

10(b) in maintaining that more than negligence was required.
This position later was adopted by the Supreme Court in Hochfelder.
Yet the rule-making power granted to the Securities and Exchange
Commission by Section 10(b) authorizes rules making it unlawful
"to use or employ . . .any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance ... (emphasis added). These words4 5negate liability
for a mere negligent omission or misrepresentation.
With the conflicting lines of authority between the Circuits
causing considerable concern and confusion, the Supreme Court's
intervention in Hochfelder was expected.
IV. HOCHFELDER
On appeal from the district court's decision granting defendaht's motion for summary judgment, the Seventh Circuit pursued
its own flexible duty approach, holding that defendants would be
found liable as aider-abettors for a rule 10b-5 violation upon a
showing that their conduct fulfilled five criteria. 46 Unlike the
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 735.
479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1305.
Accordingly, where, as here, it is urged that the defendant
through action as well as inaction has facilitated the fraud of
another, a claim for aiding and abetting is made on demonstrating: (1) that the defendant had a duty of inquiry; (2)
the plaintiff was a beneficiary of that duty of inquiry; (3)
the defendant breached the duty of inquiry; (4) concomitant
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factors the court in White determined to be of significance, the
47
of the 1934 Act
Seventh Circuit looked solely at section 17(a)

and Rule 17a-5 48 to find the duty of Ernst & Ernst to exercise
reasonable care in conducting the audit according to generally
accepted auditing standards, including investigation into First Securities' internal accounting controls. The case was remanded by
the court to consider whether Ernst & Ernst was negligent in failing
to uncover Nay's mail rule, and if so, whether there was a causal
connection between the breach of duty of inquiry and facilitation
of the underlying fraud.
One of the issues before the Seventh Circuit was whether Ernst
& Ernst was liable under common law for negligent misrepresentation. After recital of the outer limits of such liability, the court
dismissed the claim, holding that "at no time did Ernst & Ernst
specifically foresee that plaintiffs' limited class might suffer from
the consequences of a negligent audit on its part."49 Unaware of
Nay's solicitations concerning the "escrow accounts," Ernst & Ernst
could not envision plaintiffs as a class to which it owed a duty of
inquiry.
The narrow issue presented on appeal to the Supreme Court
was whether scienter is a necessary element of an "aiding and
abetting"'5 0 violation of rule 10b-5. Nevertheless, the Court framed
the issue 51 to cover all private causes of action for damages
under section 10(b), thereby expanding the reach of the decision
beyond the immediate facts. This result was the necessary outgrowth of the Court's desire to find one standard applicable in all
section 10(b) cases.
The decision hinged, as have past decisions considering the
issue, on how the Court interprets Congress's intent in proposing
with the breach of duty of inquiry the defendant breached a
duty of disclosure; and (5) there is a causal connection be-

tween the breach of duty of inquiry and disclosure and the

facilitation of the underlying fraud.
503 F.2d at 1104.
47. See note 9- supra.
48. See note 9 supra.
49. 503 F.2d at 1107.

50. The concept is borrowed from criminal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a)
(1970). There appears to be some dispute whether aiding and abetting is a separate tort under securities law. See A. BROMBERG, supra
note 29, at 204.175.
51. "We granted certiorari to resolve the question whether a private
cause of action for damages will lie under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in
the absence of any allegation of "scienter"-intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." 425 U.S. at 193.

RULE 10b-5

and passing section 10(b). Recognizing that an examination of
committee hearing transcripts and reports is generally unrevealing,
Justice Powell, writing the opinion, looked to what he considered
to be the common understanding of the essential words in section
10(b).
Section 10 (b) makes unlawful the use or employment of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in contravention of
Commission rules. The words "manipulate or deceptive" used in

conjunction with "device or contrivance" strongly suggest that §
10(b)52 was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct.

Additionally, the Court considered section 10(b) in relation to
those provisions of both Acts providing explicit civil remedies.
The Court found it significant that where Congress allowed recovery for negligent conduct, procedural restrictions also were
attached.
Section 11 (e) of the 1933 Act, for example, authorizes the court
to require a plaintiff bringing a suit under § 11, § 12(2), or § 15
thereof to post a bond for costs, including attorney's fees and in
specified circumstances to assess costs at the conclusion of the litigation. Section 13 specifies a statute of limitations of one year
from the time the violation was or should have been discovered,
in no event to exceed three years from the time of offer or sale,
applicable to actions brought under § 11, § 12(2), or § 15 ....

Such extension [to actions premised on negligent wrongdoing]

would allow causes of action covered by § 11, § 12(2), or § 15
to be brought instead under § 10 (b) and thereby nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural restrictions on these express actions. 53

V. ANALYSIS
Prevention of securities fraud on the public through rigorous
enforcement of the securities laws promotes three policies: (1)
restoration of investor confidence in the corporate capacity to deal
fairly with its security holders, (2) disclosure of material information upon which the investor can make an intelligent decision, and
(3) strengthening of the American economy as a whole through
elimination of many practices which contributed to the stock market crash of 1929. Although these policies are commendable, the
absence of comprehensive and clear standards 54 in the 1933 and
1934 Acts establishing the bounds of fraud liability has left courts
the dilemma of choosing between two important principles. On
52. Id. at 197.
53. Id. at 209-10.
54. See 3 H.
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1-13 (1975).

1-3,
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the one hand, courts have the responsibility to provide relief on an
ad hoc basis from fraudulent practices novel in their approach and
beyond the explicit reach of any statutory design. If congressional
policies embodied in the acts are to be furthered, courts cannot
look solely to the language of those fraud provisions dealing with
particular transactions and parties. In this respect, the broad
language of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 affords an appropriate
vehicle for courts attempting to fashion a more comprehensive
scheme of fraud liability. Simultaneously, it must be recognized
that if those affected by these statutes are expected to pattern their
behavior so as to avoid liability for tremendous damages, the legal
criteria for determining liability must provide a reasonable indication of the proscribed activities. 55 The Court's determination to
adhere closely to the language of section 10(b), while raising some
issues addressed below, merits recognition as a step toward placing
the burden on Congress to provide more explicit guidelines with
respect to establishing rule 10b-5 private rights of action and fraud
liability in general.
The Court's decision in Hochfelder perhaps can be understood
better after consideration of the difficulties inherent in the Seventh
Circuit's approach reaching the opposite result.
Because Ernst & Ernst was not a party to the immediate
transactions involving the escrow accounts, the Seventh Circuit had
to inject a secondary theory of liability if plaintiffs were to recover
for their loss. The court found that the duty which Ernst & Ernst
owed to the plaintiffs arose from section 17(a), requiring an audit
and filing of statements in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards. But rather than create a new cause of action
under 17(a), section 10(b), supplemented with an aiding and
abetting theory, constituted the vehicle for finding liability. One
conceptual difficulty with this approach rests in the court's loose
application of the aiding and abetting theory. Contrasted with the
weight of authority articulated previously by the Seventh Circuit
and by other circuits5" all of which require some awareness by the
55. The American Law Institute has drafted a comprehensive legislative
scheme governing federal regulation of securities. Included is a section devoted to fraudulent and manipulative acts. See A.L.I. FEDERAL
SECURITMS CODE (Reptrs. Rev. Tent. Draft Nos. 1-3, 1974).
56. See Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975)
(an alleged aider-abettor should be found liable only if scienter of
the high "conscious intent variety" can be proved); Securities Exchange Commission v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975) (accused party must have general awareness
that his role was part of an overall activity that is improper); Landy
v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
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aider-abettor of his assistance in the fraud, the Seventh Circuit was
content to substitute an alleged negligent breach of a section 17(a)
duty even though defendants had no knowledge of the escrow
accounts. Additionally, if the court determined that Ernst & Ernst
breached a duty of inquiry established by section 17(a), creation
of a new section 17(a) cause of action would have avoided the
need to distort the aiding and abetting theory and further entangle
the web of section 10 (b) and rule 10b-5.
The logic of the Seventh Circuit's approach is further weakened by a consideration of the relation of section 17 to section 18
of the 1934 Act. Section 1857 creates a private right of action
against certain persons, including accountants, who "make or cause
to be made" materially misleading statements in reports or other
documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Since the reports omitting mention of the "mail rule" were filed
with the Commission by Ernst & Ernst pursuant to section 17(a),
section 18 would have provided an appropriate remedy. Liability
extends to persons who, in reliance on such statements, purchased
or sold a security whose price was affected by such statements.
Liability will not lie if the person being sued proves he acted in
good faith and without knowledge that the statement was false.
Although there is no indication that section 18 was intended to be
the sole authority for providing recovery from misleading statements filed pursuant to the requirements of the 1934 Act, its
remedy rarely would be used if plaintiffs need only satisfy the lesser
standards established by the Seventh Circuit. Consequently, the
inherent consistency manifested in the 1934 Act was sacrificed in
the court's determination to find Ernst & Ernst liable.
The Court's decision in Hochfelder rectified the potentially
bothersome approach pursued in the Seventh Circuit by requiring
adherence to a stricter interpretation of section 10(b) to find rule
10b-5 liability. However, in holding scienter to be a necessary
416 U.S. 960 (1974) (knowledge of the wrong's existence required);
Securities and Exchange Commission v. First Securities Co. of Chicago,
463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972) (First Securities had knowledge of Nay's "mail rule" and permitted its use); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (the president and chief counsel of the corporation were "aware of the defrauder's scheme" to use
client's money as working capital).
57.
(a) Any person who shall make or cause to be made any
statement in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder. ..
which statement was at the time and in light of the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall be liable to any person (not

396

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 56, NO. 2 (1977)

element for all private actions under section 10(b), the decision
itself poses three problems concerning its possible scope.
First, courts may be faced with the issue of whether the Securities and Exchange Commission now must prove scienter when
bringing an enforcement action for compliance with regulations
promulgated under section 10(b). If the Court's decision hinged
on its construction of the words "manipulate, device, and contrivance" in section 10(b) as evidence of Congressional intent to
proscribe only fraudulent conduct where scienter was present, then
presumably, the same meaning attaches to all section 10(b) actions. Prior to Hochfelder,58 therd was little doubt that a rule
10b-5 action for injunctive relief could be brought by the Securities
and Exchange Commission upon a showing of negligence. Justification for a lesser standard can be supported primarily on the
notion that where prohibition of identifiable future conduct is
involved, little need exists for showing whether defendants had
actual knowledge of their alleged illicit practices in the past or not.
The past state of defendant's mind is irrelevant. The argument is
persuasive and should continue to be the basis for not requiring
proof of scienter in Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions.
Second, stockholders may be afforded inconsistent means of
relief depending upon whether the fraud was committed in the sale
or in the purchase of securities. As evinced by the previous
discussion of rule 10b-5, its promulgation was a response to a
situation where a person, usually a corporate insider, committed
fraud during his purchase of securities. After Hochfelder, it is
possible that a corporation will be compelled to pay damages for
negligence committed in the sale of its securities, but not for
negligence in any purchases. For instance, a negligent failure by a
corporate employee to make a notation in the records regarding a
$500,000 tax refund would be insufficient grounds for the seller of
securities to the corporation, relying on those records, to recover
under rule l0b-5. 59 Scienter must be proved. However, negligent
omission of a notation in the prospectus of a $500,000 tax liability
knowing that such statement was false or misleading) who,
in reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold
a security at a price which was affected by such statement,
for damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued
shall prove, that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge
that such statement was false or misleading.
15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
58. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 176 (1968).
59. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967).
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may give rise to corporate liability under section 12(2)60 of the
1933 Act. Any attempt to rationalize treating these examples
differently is specious. Thus, having fixed a rigid standard of
scienter for every rule 10b-5 action, the Court's decision removed
the flexibility needed to apply the securities laws consistently and
rationally.
A third issue involves the Court's definition of scienter. In a
footnote, Justice Powell stated:
In this opinion the term "scienter" refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain areas of
the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act. We need not
address here the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless
behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10 and Rule
10b-5.61
Arguably, the Court's reluctance to decide one way or the other
rests upon a desire to avoid binding itself to a conclusion of law
until actually presented with the issue. Additionally, commentators differ on whether standards of negligence and recklessness are
even appropriate for misrepresentation cases, which technically
involve a duty to inform rather than a duty of care. Nevertheless,
whatever conceptual difficulty abounds in attempting to apply duty
of care to misrepresentation cases, the practical affect of applying
one or the other may be of little significance to the factfinder. In
other words, in most instances a finding of liability may result
regardless of whether the standard is framed in terms of whether
defendant "had knowledge of facts stimulating inquiry"0 2 or "acted
in conscious disregard of or indifference to the risk that recipients
of information will be misled." 63 Finally, if scienter is to be a
required element in all section 10(b) cases, clarification by the
Court of what definitional standards the term embraces would have
contributed to a better understanding by future courts faced with
applying the requisite scienter standard. In all probability, how60. Any person who(2) offers or sells a security ... by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact ...
who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing the security.
15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
61. 425 U.S. at 194, n.12.
62. 1 IERRMLL ON NoTICE § 18 (1952) (definition of "constructive knowledge").
63. A. BROMBERG, supra note 29, at 204.208, (definition of "recklessness").
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ever, courts will look to the term's meaning at common
law-a
'64
meaning which generally has included "recklessness.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Since its inception as a private right of action, section 10(b)
has been the most powerful weapon in the plaintiff's arsenal of
fraud provisions. Its reach, unimpeded by any congressional language evincing a desire to confine its application, had expanded
inexorably to cover transactions and parties not covered by the
more explicit prescriptions under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The
Court's decision in Hochfelder, requiring proof of scienter in all
private actions brought under rule 10b-5 undoubtedly will restrict
the rule's coverage of fraud liability in the future by removing the
flexibility some courts had exercised in attempting to fashion relief
according to the broader policies underlying the 1933 and 1934
Acts.
However, by confining lower courts to a stricter interpretation
of section 10(b)'s language, the Court has determined that if the
legislative scheme is unclear in its intended scope, the responsibility
for determining the outer bounds of fraud liability rests with
Congress not the courts. In this respect, Hochfelder more accurately reflects what most other courts considering the issue had
previously declared-it is simply fulfilling congressional intent.
Larry V. Albers '77
64. See note 14 supra.

